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Feminist standpoint theory has a contentious history. It is an explicitly political as well as social 
epistemology, characterized by the thesis that those who are marginalized or oppressed under 
conditions of systemic inequity may, in fact, be better knowers, in a number of respects, than those who 
are socially or economically privileged. Their epistemic advantage arises from the kinds of experience 
they are likely to have, situated as they are, and the resources available to them for understanding this 
experience. Feminist standpoint theorists argue that gender is one dimension of social differentiation 
that makes such an epistemic difference.1  
 
Standard critiques of feminist standpoint theory attribute to it two manifestly untenable theses: that 
epistemically consequential standpoints must be conceptualized in essentialist terms, and that those 
who occupy them have automatic and comprehensive epistemic privilege. A world structured by 
hierarchical, oppressive social divisions thus becomes a world of unbridgeable epistemic solitudes. I 
agree that neither thesis is tenable and I argue that neither is a necessary presupposition of standpoint 
theory. The anxious philosophical nightmare of corrosive relativism2 does not afflict standpoint theorists 
any more than it does other varieties of social epistemology and socially naturalized contextualism, and 
need not be epistemically disabling in any case. My aim here is to offer a systematic reformulation of 
standpoint theory, and address two questions:  What epistemic insights does standpoint theory offer? 
And what is the scope of its application?  
 
I. The challenge: Why standpoint theory?  
 
To start, consider the kinds of epistemic problem to which feminist standpoint theory is a response. 
When contemporary feminist standpoint theory took shape in the 1970s and early 1980s, the catalyst 
was not strictly philosophical. That is, standpoint theorists were not chiefly concerned with internally 
generated questions about hypothetical possibilities in a space of epistemic positions defined by 
centuries-old philosophical tradition. Rather, they were responding to epistemic questions raised by 
second wave feminist research and activism. The challenge they took up was to make sense of the 
impact that feminist interventions had had on well established research programs in a wide range of 
fields, destabilizing conventional assumptions about sex/gender, bringing to light limitations and errors 
in well established research programs that had gone unremarked and often, in the process, opening up 
productive new lines of inquiry. This seemed to fly in the face of conventional epistemic wisdom; how 
was it that these pivotal insights, critical and constructive, should arise from research informed by an 
explicitly political angle of vision? It was in response to the transformative effects of these feminist 
interventions that standpoint theorists explored a cluster of contextualist claims about the ways in which 
the social, specifically gendered, identity of knowers can affect not only their recognition as epistemic 
agents but also the epistemic resources and capacities on which they draw as knowers.3 Here, then, 
are a few examples of contexts in which, three and four decades ago, feminist theorists encountered 
and explored the epistemic effects of gendered socialization, experience, relations of production and 
reproduction  
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First, as activists in the 1960s and 1970s, feminists struggled to identify and to name patterns of 
disenfranchisement and inequity that had gone unrecognized or, indeed, were vehemently denied. One 
example, recently discussed by Miranda Fricker, was the difficult process of characterizing what is now 
understood to be “sexual harassment” (2007, 149-152). She focuses on the ways in which 
“hermeneutical lacuna” – a gap in the collective hermeneutic resource “where the name of a distinctive 
social experience should be” (2007, 150) – can create an “asymmetrical disadvantage for the 
harrassee” (2007, 151). The famous case of Carmita Wood4 that Fricker considers at length illustrates 
how the dearth of conceptual resources for recognizing this experience was a self-reinforcing effect of 
gendered hierarchies of power, a form of structural discrimination that was hard to detect precisely 
because it had not previously been named as such.5 It also illustrates how, in the process of addressing 
this hermeneutical disadvantage, those affected by it drew on experiential evidence and articulated 
conceptual resources that put them in a position to delineate an empirical phenomenon,6 a “middle 
range fact” as Mary Morgan puts it,7 the dynamics and effects of which have proven to be as stubbornly 
persistent as they are consequential. 
 
By the mid-1980s, grass-roots activist research on workplace environment issues had extended the 
insights articulated in cases like Wood’s to a number of other types of subtle, largely unremarked 
gender dynamics by which women found themselves persistently undervalued and marginalized even 
as overt policies of exclusion were struck down. From the mid-1970s through the early 1980s Mary 
Rowe (1974), and Roberta Hall and Bernice Sandler (1982, 1984, 1986), introduced the metaphors of 
“micro-inequities” and “chilly climates,” bringing into focus the effects implicit bias that operates through 
small-scale, often unintended and unrecognized gender differences in uptake and response, 
recognition and evaluation.8  In the late 1980s Arlie Hochschild coined the term “the second shift” (also 
“double work day”) to capture the impact of gender norms that maintain traditional divisions of labor in 
the household and even ramp up the domestic demands on women as they moved into the wage labor 
market in increasing numbers (1989 [2003]).9 The metaphors of  “glass ceilings,” “leaky pipelines”, and 
a “gender tax” on women’s wages were coined in the same period, and in the early 1990s Margaret 
Rossiter proposed the term “Mathilda effect,” inverting Merton’s “Matthew Effect” (Rossiter 1993), to 
capture persistent patterns of cumulative disadvantage that arise when “micro-inequities” operate 
unchecked in supposedly meritocratic systems.10   
 
The contours of these phenomena emerged with great difficulty, the hard-won outcome of collective 
processes of critical reflection and investigation that took root in many different contexts. Time and 
again you see references to a “shock of recognition” (Aisenberg and Harrington, 1988, ix; Brownmiller 
1980, 280), when the process of comparison threw into relief strikingly similarities in experiences that 
women had assumed were idiosyncratic, drawing attention to recurrent patterns of difference in 
recognition and authority, mechanisms of deflection and marginalization (including sexual objectification 
and harassment). The struggle to articulate experiential insights that do not fit conventional 
expectations is palpable – a matter of coming to terms with the compounding effects of hermeneutical 
lacunae, testimonial injustice, and willful ignorance. But in many cases these metaphorically invoked 
inequities and the mechanisms that produce them have proven to be robust social phenomena; they 
have become a staple of empirical investigation, the target of equity policies and of activist 
interventions. Research programs initiated in the 1970s have since documented systemic gender 
inequities using national databases and field or sector-scale analyses. Their contributions include, for 
example, economic models of persistent gender differences in income that control for a wide range of 
potentially confounding factors (Ginther 2004); finegrained analyses of career paths that delineate exit 
patterns and choke points specific to particular types of training pipeline and career ladder (Xie and 
Shauman 2003); models of age- and rank-graded patterns of cumulative disadvantage that arise within 
field and instiution-specific career paths, of the kind that identified in the famous report of the MIT 
Committee on Women Faculty in the School of Science as “post-civil rights era discrimination” (MIT 
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1999). In addition, since the 1960s research programs have taken shape in sociolinguistics and in 
cognitive and social psychology that have produced a rich array of insights into the nature and workings 
of internalized cognitive schemas that shape a variety of default assumptions and automatic responses, 
to do with race, ethnicity, linguistic and national affiliations, religion, age, and sexuality, as well as 
gender.11 These have brought into view a repertoire of now well-documented mechanisms that operate 
below the threshold of conscious awareness – various forms of evaluation bias, attribution bias, 
stereotype mobilization, group dynamics, and norms of recognition, uptake, response – the effects of 
which ramify into the large scale, cumulative gender differences in outcome invoked by the metaphors 
of a gender tax, glass ceilings, leaky pipelines, and the “Mathilda effect” that feminist activists posited in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
The transformative effects of distinctively feminist critiques and insights extended well beyond research 
that explicitly addressed questions about gender inequity. A remarkably diverse range of feminist 
research programs took shape in one after another social, historical science and, increasingly, in the 
biological and medical sciences, putting significant pressure on everything from key empirical claims to 
orienting assumptions about specific subject domains, from localized methodological norms, to field-
defining ideals of scientific practice.12 Consider a few examples that illustrate what these research 
programs involved and influenced the formation of feminist standpoint theory.  
 
Within sociology, Dorothy Smith advocated a program of ethnomethodological research designed to 
document and theorize how the “everyday world” looks to those who primarily operate off-stage, in 
gender-normative roles that put them disproportionately in the position of maintaining social 
relationships and collective physical well being (Smith 1974). One illustration of this approach was a 
series of studies she undertook with Alison Griffith of the ways in which school day routines and the 
work organization of women’s lives amplify rigidly gendered parenting responsibilities: the tutoring, 
lunch making, and other voluntary contributions of labor and resources expected of mothers (1987, 
181-187). She was interested in “the concrete actualities” as well as the ways women conceptualized 
“mothering as work” (Howard 1988, 21). As an influential standpoint theorist, Smith advocated a set of 
methodological strategies for recovering dimensions of the social world that are typically “eclipsed” 
(1974, 7; 1987, 17-36): whatever the social context under study, she urged researchers to start from 
the perspectives and experience of those who are marginal, ask what they understand, work with their 
cognitive schemas and categories. This approach was intended to counter the imposition of categories 
that reflect the situated experience and assumptions of sociological outsiders; it puts the researcher in 
a position to learn how social relations, institutions, conventions actually operate, and to recognize their 
effects as “ruling practices” (1974, 8) that are often not visible to those who operate “center stage,” who 
benefit from the status quo and who largely define the agenda of social sciences. This was, in effect, 
exactly what Chilly Climate activist researchers were doing at a grass-roots level, taking their dissonant 
experience as a point of departure for understanding the ways in which meritocratic systems actually 
operate.13  
 
Another prominent sociologist, Patricia Hill Collins, emphasized the distinctively raced as well as 
gendered insights of social science insider-outsiders. She brought a critical perspective to bear on 
mainstream research that, despite trenchant critiques, continued to reproduce the kinds of racial and 
class bias associated with the Moynihan report and its pathologizing characterization of Black family 
structure and “culture of poverty” (Gans 2011). She describes the “mismatch” between her own 
working-class Black experience and the “taken-for-granted assumptions of sociology” about “the 
family”, “human capital,” and the causes and effects of poverty (1991, 47-54), showing how the 
questions asked, the data gathered, the analytic and interpretive resources on which sociologists 
typically rely to make sense of their data embody their own dominantly white, middle class experience, 
as understood through the lens of masculine roles. Her constructive response takes the form of a 
systematic reassessment of core sociological concepts that reflects the social and economic realities 
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navigated by black women; she articulated a resolutely intersectional genre of standpoint theory.  
 
 
Perhaps most influential in philosophical contexts is Carol Gilligan’s critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
psychological models of moral maturation, a key source of inspiration for the articulation of an ethics of 
care.14 Her point of departure was concern that Kohlberg’s system was based exclusively on interviews 
with boys, obscuring a distinctively contextual and relational mode of reasoning about moral problems 
that, while not exclusively associated with girls, did surface more prominently in their responses (1987). 
But more broadly, she questioned Kohlberg’s assumption that there must be a single, universal 
trajectory of moral development, a conviction that led him to treat recalcitrant counter-evidence – the 
non-conforming responses of girls – as anomalies, evidence that girls were maturing more slowly than 
their male counterparts. Her posit of a “different voice” has itself been sharply criticized on grounds that, 
for example, she maintained a broadly Piagetian conception of maturation; she shared with Kholberg 
the assumption that distinct modes of moral reasoning reflect discrete developmental stages and did 
not explore the possibility that some of these might, instead, constitute a repertoire of situationally-
attuned responses that are elicited by changes in context and inflected by race and class difference 
(Fraser and Nicholson 1990, 133; Heyes 1999,154). Nonetheless, the strategy of critique she deployed 
in “creating a space for girls to be heard” (Heyes 1997, 149) threw into sharp relief systematic gender 
bias in the selection of subjects, the framing of analytic categories, and the interpretation of empirical 
findings that had gone unrecognized until she brought the resources of a feminist perspective to bear. 
Although she had significantly reframed her own alternative account within five years of the publication 
of In a Different Voice (1982, 1987), her original critique demonstrated the need for nuanced attention 
to gendered dimensions of difference among moral subjects that had not been taken into account 
except as evidence of deficiency.   
 
Critical challenges to gender-conventional assumptions arose not only in the context of research on 
contemporary subjects in familiar contexts, but also in the study of historically and culturally distant 
others. The historian Jane Kelly-Gadol drew attention to how different the “Renaissance” looks if you 
attend to the fortunes of women. It was anything but a period of cultural rebirth for women, indeed, she 
argues, there was “no ‘renaissance’ for women, at least not during the Renaissance; there was, on the 
contrary, a marked restriction of the scope and powers of women” (1976, 811). Moreover, she argues 
that this was a direct consequence “of the very developments for which this age is noted,” and reflects 
“a fairly regular pattern of relative loss for women precisely in those periods of so-called progressive 
change” (1976, 810). As Kelly-Gadol develops this critique, it is not just a brief for reexamining the 
specifics of the period we conventionally refer to as the Renaissance, but for a thorough-going 
reassessment of the periodization scheme in terms of which European history has been written (1977). 
 
In a similar spirit, by the late 1960s and early 1970s feminist anthropologists had demonstrated how 
different things look ethnographically if you attend to the activities, language, relationships, and 
perspectives of women; they were intent on reclaiming women’s words and cultural worlds, focusing on 
the private, domestic dimensions of well-studied cultural contexts that had been eclipsed (to use 
Smith’s language) by a preoccupation with the public roles and activities of men that were taken to 
stand for the cultural whole. Much was accomplished but almost immediately the substantive insights 
generated by this program of remedial research began put pressure on the assumptions about gender 
difference and separate spheres in terms of which it had been conceived. A series of auto-critiques 
appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s in which feminist anthropologists scrutinized the familiar 
sex/gender binaries they had projected onto culturally distant, typically non-industrialized cultures. 
Michelle Rosaldo argued, in an especially trenchant analysis that appeared in 1980, that the gendered 
conception of a “domestic” sphere, and the sharp segregation of private from public, was itself a 
product of the formation of a distinctively Euro-American middle class in the late 19th century. The 
enthnocentrism of assuming that these categories are salient in other cultural contexts could not but 
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undermine the feminist ambition of grasping the diversity of ways in which sex/gender differences are 
marked (or not) across the range of cultures that had been the subject of ethnographic study. It would 
be necessary to significantly broaden the scope of feminist critique, shifting attention from the 
challenges of “adding women” to more subtle and far-reaching questions about framework assumptions 
(Rosaldo 1980, 390). 15 From this it follows that the potential relevance of feminist analysis extends well 
beyond the investigation of explicitly gendered subjects. Reflecting on the implications of women’s 
history, which followed a similar trajectory, Peter Novick notes that “in principle, feminist perspectives in 
history [proved to be] as relevant to such male activities as war and diplomacy as they were to realms 
in which women dominated,” even though in practice, these implications often remained sharply 
circumscribed  (1988, 496).  
 
Finally, one domain where the convergence of several lines of feminist analysis has had a profound 
impact is in challenges to theories of human evolution which take it for granted that “the demands of the 
hunt shaped the characteristics that make us human” (Dahlberg 1981, 1). The impetus for rethinking 
conventional “man the hunter” models came, in part, from a reassessment of research on what had 
been known as hunting, or hunter-gatherer, societies (Lee and Devore 1968). Ethnographers who had 
turned their attention to the roles and activities of women “gatherers” learned that, in sub-tropical, 
desert, and temperate regions, their foraging activities provide small game and plant resources that 
account for as much as 70% of the dietary intake of the group as a whole.  Indeed, they found that 
when women captured small game it was described as having been “gathered” or collected, whereas it 
was recorded as “hunting” when attributed to men (Zihlman 1997, 100). They learned, as well, that 
women are by no means sedentary and dependent on resources provided by their male counterparts; 
there are often gender differences in mobility patterns, but women range widely and, given the 
distinctive breadth of their foraging activities, they have especially comprehensive knowledge of 
regional ecology. The result is that women play a key role determining group movement when these 
decisions turn on considerations of resource availability, exercising forms of power and leadership 
typically presumed to be the exclusive domain of men (e.g., Sally Slocum 1975; see overviews by 
Dahlberg 1981, and Fedigan and Fedigan 1989).  
 
In the first instance, these reassessments of “hunting” societies inspired the corrective of “woman the 
gatherer” models of human evolution according to which it was the reproductive advantages conferred 
by the social and cognitive skills required for success in women’s traditional foraging activities that 
drove human evolution. But within a decade internal critique made it clear that this female-centered 
antithesis was just as problematic as the sexist and androcentric models of human evolution it was 
intended to displace; a more fundamental conceptual realignment would be required if accounts of 
human origins were to adequately reflect what had been learned about the flexible, active roles of 
women and children in foraging societies (Zihlman 1997, 96-99, 109). The debate is ongoing, but it 
seems clear that the sex/gender roles observed among contemporary foragers, much less those 
characteristic of the post-industrial societies in which most researchers have been socialized, cannot 
plausibly be projected onto deep prehistory. Parallel lines of critique arose from reassessments of what 
had been assumed about primate social dynamics. Field research that systematically documented the 
activities of female primates demonstrated that they are by no means passive coquettes, dominated by 
and dependent upon aggressive male strategists. But neither does the inversion of these assumptions 
do justice to flexibility and diversity of behavior that was increasingly being reported by close observers 
of contemporary primates. As Susan Sperling puts it in a memorable assessment of this debate, 
“langurs with lipstick are no improvement over baboons with briefcases” (1991, 27). Reflecting on the 
implications of such anthropomorphism for evolutionary theorizing, she argues that “the new female 
primate… dressed for success and liv[ing] in a troop that resembles the modern corporation” (1991, 4) 
is no more adequate a framework for understanding contemporary primates, or ancestral primate and 
hominid populations, than the stereotypes of an earlier era. In short, the impact of bringing a critical 
perspective to bear on the gendered, and also class and race-inflected assumptions that had framed 
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research in these various fields was a growing appreciation that our hominid and proto-hominid 
ancestors most likely lived in social groups and depended on subsistence strategies that were unlike 
any that are familiar from primatological or ethnohistorical research in contemporary contexts.16 
 
The pattern that emerges repeatedly in the trajectories by which feminist research programs took shape 
is that, although they often began as modest interventions, almost invariably the process of filling gaps 
and correcting biases drew attention to deeper, more pervasive problems. In some cases, remedial 
research raised questions that could only be addressed by considering new lines of evidence and by 
expanding the range of conceptual resources brought to bear in the analysis and interpretation of this 
evidence. Within history, records that had been considered emphemera – diaries, pamphlet literature, 
various forms of material culture – were crucial in tracing the historical fortunes of women, among other 
disenfranchised subjects of “history from below.” Attention to women’s experience and gendered 
dimensions of everyday life were a key source of insight into dimensions of social experience that had 
been missed by ethnographers, or were systematically occluded by conventional census and survey 
research. By contrast, it was by reframing the analysis of existing national employment and census 
data – bringing new questions to bear and probing for patterns that hadn’t previously been investigated 
– that feminist economists and quantitative sociologists were able to trace the cumulative effects of 
small scale differences in opportunity and reward, fleshing out the contours of pipeline effects, a gender 
tax, and cumulative disadvantage. And it was a process of critically scrutinizing the background 
knowledge (itself empirical) in terms of which primary paleontological data had been interpreted as 
evidence that put feminists in a position to reframe evolutionary theorizing. As remedial research took 
shape, drawing attention to pervasive patterns of error and distortion in a wide range of fields, it 
became clear that the challenge was not just to add missing pieces to an existing puzzle but to reframe 
the puzzle as a whole, with ramifying implications.  I have focused here on the human, social sciences, 
but there are striking parallels with feminist interventions in the medical and life sciences;17 I return to 
questions of scope at the end.  
 
The upshot is, then, that feminist interventions catalyzed transformative criticism18 in a remarkably 
diverse range of fields over quite a short period, from the late 1960s through the 1980s. This had the 
effect, not just of redirecting empirical inquiry, modulating methodological norms, and calling into 
question entrenched framework assumptions but, as Novick has emphasized with respect to history, it 
also destabilized conventional ideals of objectivity conceived in terms of a vernacular positivism: the 
conviction that epistemic success in empirical research is characterized by, and should take as its 
primary goal, convergence on a single, comprehensive, true understanding of the world, and that a 
necessary condition for such success is the insulation of empirical inquiry from the influence of social, 
contextual values and interests.19  
 
In contexts dominated by these epistemic ideals, the kinds of critique and, crucially, the constructive 
contributions made by feminist research programs pose a significant epistemic challenge, one that was 
often recognized, commented on, wrestled with by practitioners themselves. How could systematic 
error and distortion have arisen and persisted so long in research programs that had been conducted 
with integrity, that were apparently impartial with respect to social and political values, and that could 
claim significant empirical and explanatory success? Often the target of feminist critique was not 
manifestly inadequate science of the kind that, for example, Elisabeth Lloyd has documented in 
connection with selectionist accounts of human female orgasm (2005) but, rather, the ubiquitous 
partiality of good science, science as usual, even our best science, as Harding put it in the mid-1980s 
(1986, 102). By extension, why was it that, with respect to gender bias, it was women and most often 
feminists who noticed these incongruities, subjected them to critical scrutiny, and initiated the empirical 
research programs that identified and counteracted of sexist and androcentric bias? In contexts where 
objectivity was presumed to be irrevocably compromised whenever contextual values or political 
commitments intrude, this last raised a particularly thorny set of questions.  
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II. The response: Initial formulations  
 
It was in response to these challenges that feminist standpoint theorists asked: What would a theory of 
knowledge look like if you took seriously the possibility that entrenched, systemic inequalities in our 
material and social conditions of life can be epistemically enabling? What are the implications of taking 
gender and other social identity categories as a basis for questioning the ways in which epistemic 
agency had been idealized? These are, I contend, the epistemic challenges of our time. I suggest that 
the feminist standpoint theories formulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s are best understood as an 
exploration of resources for answering these questions in philosophical and scientific contexts where 
any association of empirical success with identity politics was deeply incongruous.   
 
Two types of explanatory resource figure prominently in the initial formulations of feminist standpoint 
theory that appeared in the 1970s and early 1980s. To account for how distinctive epistemic resources 
could arise from gendered identities and social relations, Marxist feminists posited gender-specific 
modes and relations of production, and those influenced by object relations theory appealed to the 
psychoanalytic processes of infantile gender socialization. Nancy Hartsock makes use of both in her 
influential essay, “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical 
Materialism” (1983). 
 
As Hartsock’s title suggests, her point of departure was the insight from Marx that, only by adopting the 
perspective of those dispossessed by exploitative, class-structured relations of production is it possible 
to grasp “what is really involved in the purchase and sale of labor power” (1983, 287), how surplus 
value is generated, how class-based inequalities in power and resources are perpetuated, and how 
these processes are rationalized and mystified. On Marx’s account, the source and ground of a 
distinctive proletarian standpoint – the critical angle of vision that confers these epistemic advantages – 
is the kind of practical, embodied activity associated with this class position. Those who must sell their 
labor, who lack control of the means of production and must navigate a class-structured world from a 
position of relative powerlessness, have direct experience of social realities that those in positions of 
structural advantage can ignore, and that are systematically obscured by a dominant ideology that 
serves to legitimate exploitative relations (1983, 285-288). Hartsock reframes these arguments in terms 
that make “the ’gender differentiation of labor’… a central category of analysis” (1983, 307, citing Young 
1980, 185), and that capture the epistemic implications of hierarchically structured gender relations of 
production and, crucially relations of reproduction. She argues that “women’s work…differs 
systematically from men’s” (1983, 289), and that this sexual division of labor is fundamental, not 
reducible to or derived from more basic conditions of class difference. Women make a “dual 
contribution to subsistence in capitalism” (1983, 291); not only do they labor for wages, but they are 
delegated primary responsibility for household production. Women are thus immersed in the concrete 
labor required to sustain a “complex relational network” (1983, 293); they produce, socialize, and 
maintain the well-being of other human beings, a labor that primarily generates use-values rather than 
commodities that have exchange value.20 
 
This classic feminist reformulation of historical materialism provides a framework for understanding how 
systematic gender differences arise in our social relations and in practical, material life activities and, 
crucially, how they are maintained as structural conditions. But to explain how individuals internalize 
these conditions such that they become the ground for a distinctively gendered psychological and 
cognitive orientation, Hartsock appealed to object relations theory. This, she argued, supplies a 
mechanism, in the form of early childhood socialization, that, under conditions of a sexual division of 
labor in child rearing, accounts for the formation of gendered conceptions of the self that are so deeply 
entrenched they are experienced (and rationalized) as natural. Following Chodorow and Flax, Hartsock 
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argued that, when the primary caregivers are women, male children are put in the position of 
articulating their masculine identity “in opposition to another who threatens one’s very being” (1983, 
296), the female caregiver upon whom he is dependent but from whom he must differentiate himself; 
indeed, they must learn masculinity through identification “with an abstract, cultural stereotype” (1983, 
295). By contrast, femininity “is concrete for girls,” given the continuity of identification with a female 
caregiver; a characteristically feminine self emerges that is said to be experienced in relational terms, 
less threatened by interdependence and afflicted by fewer anxieties about “boundary challenges” 
(1983, 294). Hartsock saw in this early drama of individuation the psychological foundation that 
underpins institutionalized gender differences in relations of production and reproduction (1983, 295-
296); gender differences in identity and psychological orientation in turn reinforce divergent patterns of 
“material life activity” and associated experience (1983, 299). This, she argues, “has important 
epistemological and ontological consequences for both the understanding and the construction of social 
relations” (1983, 299); it is the basis for a distinctive standpoint that has the resources to “go beneath 
the surface of appearances to reveal the real but concealed social relations” of a gender as well as a 
class structured society (1983, 304). Hartsock here articulates a claim of epistemic privilege that I refer 
to, in what follows, as an “inversion thesis”: the thesis that certain kinds of epistemic advantage accrue 
to those who are otherwise (socially, materially) disadvantaged, in this case by systemic gender as well 
as class difference. If plausible, this sketch of the structural, socio-economic conditions and 
psychological mechanisms that entrench gender differences in labor and social relations explains how 
those socialized as women could acquire a body of experience and, in some cases, develop a critical, 
reflective (feminist) angle of vision that put them in a position to recognize and to critically scrutinize 
androcentric assumptions that had been taken for granted in a great many mainstream research 
programs.  
 
Evelyn Fox Keller had made much bolder claims for standpoint theory five years earlier in a famous 
essay, “Gender and Science” (1978, reprinted in 1985). Relying exclusively on object relations theory, 
she substantially extended the Chodorow and Flax line of argument, invoking gender differences in 
“intellectual posture” that arise from infantile socialization to explain an “historically pervasive 
association between masculine and objective, [and] more specifically between masculine and scientific” 
(1978, 415 and 409).  On her account, masculine identities are forged through a “quasi-universal” 
process of psychological maturation that involves, centrally, a struggle on the part of male children to 
dissociate from their female caregivers. This, in turn, creates a predisposition in those socialized as 
men to enact a “radical dichotomy between subject from object” which she finds characteristic of 
canonically objective scientific thought (1978, 424).21 In A Feeling for the Organism (1983), Keller offers 
an account of what she took to be a contrasting style of intellectual engagement manifest in the work of 
Barbara McClintock, the geneticist whose work on gene transposition in maize had long been 
inscrutable to her colleagues but who had, in the end, won a Nobel prize. She characterized 
McClintock’s special “powers of discernment” as a form of “intuition resting on sympathetic 
understanding” (Keller 1983, 200-201) which arose from a capacity to immerse oneself in the object of 
study, to “forget yourself” such that “the objects become part of you” (1983, 118). So described, 
McClintock’s practice embodies an intellectual posture “associated with stereotypically feminine gender 
traits” (Richards and Schuster 1989, 700). It is striking in retrospect that, at the end of her 1978 essay, 
Keller acknowledges that variation in research styles among male scientists, and changes in patterns of 
parenting have the potential to undermine this argument “linking [the] scientific and objective with 
masculine” (1978, 430-431). These were exactly the grounds on which her claims about McClintock 
and her association of science with a distinctively masculine epistemic orientation were pilloried by 
feminists and nonfeminists alike.  
 
The critical reaction was immediate. Steven J. Gould raised the first of the two potential objections 
acknowledged by Keller in his review of A Feeling for the Organism (1984). He could identify any 
number of successful male scientists whose practice embodies the sense of identification, of caring 
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immersion in the world of the phenomena, that Keller had attributed to the intellectual posture of those 
socialized as women. Two years later Harding, initially an advocate of standpoint theory, published an 
influential formulation of the second objection drawing on colonial counter-examples to challenge the 
empirical adequacy of the psychoanalytic thesis that a distinctively masculine as opposed to feminine 
epistemic orientation is rooted in infantile gender socialization (1986, 179-185). She noted pervasive 
similarities between the race and gender metaphors that figure in attributions of distinctive ways of 
knowing to members of African cultures and to women. In both cases, these “others” are characterized 
as immersed in the phenomenal world; they are relational subjects who see themselves as continuous 
with the objects of their knowledge, dominated by affect rather than rationality and incapable of the 
impartiality necessary for properly objective inquiry. This “curious coincidence,” Harding argues, 
decisively undermines the psychoanalytic thesis: “we certainly cannot explain the African vs. European 
dichotomy by appeal to the infant’s experience of the division of labor by gender,” inasmuch as child 
care is no more predominantly the domain of men in African than in European societies (1986, 185). It 
is more plausibly the effect of a common, underlying cause; the raced and the gendered “other” is 
defined, in both cases, in opposition to the characteristics of a normatively white, male, European 
epistemic agent, the unmarked term in a hierarchy of social categories. To understand “differences in 
cognitive styles and world views,” Harding went on to argue, rather than posit fundamental and 
universal differences in psychological orientation, it makes better sense to attend to the kinds of social 
relations and concrete activities in which epistemic agents are typically engaged within hierarchical 
systems structured by gender and race as well as class difference (1986, 189).  
 
These objections to psychoanalytic formulations of standpoint theory were quickly generalized to all 
forms of standpoint theory.22 Harding herself concluded at this juncture (1986) that standpoint theory 
represents an unstable, internally contradictory position mediating between naïve feminist empiricism 
and feminist postmodernism; if the constructivist insights associated with standpoint theory are taken 
seriously, they compel a shift to the latter, more radical position. In the event, few were willing to follow 
Harding’s lead in embracing a resolutely ironic, postmodern stance. She herself later endorsed a form 
of standpoint theory that incorporates the methodological recommendations articulated by Smith, and 
emphasizes the epistemic effects of social relations of production, much as Hartsock had, and as she 
had recommended in response to Keller (Harding 1991, 1993). 
 
Within a decade, dissatisfaction with early formulations of standpoint theory was intensified by a virulent 
reaction against all forms of identity-based politics and scholarship. Two lines of critique emerged in the 
“identity politics wars” of the 1990s that have profoundly shaped the fortunes of standpoint theory. The 
primary objection, anticipated by Gould’s reaction to Keller, was that standpoint theory presupposes a 
reified, essentialist conception of social identity: the posit of a distinctively gendered “intellectual 
posture” makes sense only given an implausibly reductive conception of women’s interests and 
identities. In making the case that “one is not born, but rather becomes a woman,” as Beauvoir 
famously put it (1952, 249),23 feminists themselves had effectively demonstrated the contingency and 
the diversity of women’s roles and identities; if the category “woman” has no anchor in essential 
attributes shared by all of its members, what basis could there be for appeals to a women’s or feminist 
“standpoint,” or for that matter, any social identity-defined standpoint? The problem with this argument 
is the assumption that, unless social identities can be grounded in social kind categories that are 
exclusive, sharply bounded, stable, and internally homogenous, they dissolve into limitless individual 
diversity. In a trenchant analysis of the philosophical and political underpinnings of the identity politics 
debates, Linda Alcoff (2006) challenges the assumption that there must be one “generic and general 
sense” in which social identity can be salient – typically one that turns on an untenable reification of 
within-group sameness (2006, 86) – otherwise social identities have no conceptual or empirical 
substance, at least none that can bear epistemic weight (2006, 42-45).24 This reflects a profound failure 
of imagination, Alcoff argues: a failure to recognize and to theorize a range of possibilities that lie 
between these implausible extremes. “Visible identities,” collectives based on ascribed and affiliative 
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identities, can be powerfully consequential in all kinds of ways – materially, socially, politically – despite 
being historically contingent, porous, and internally heterogeneous (2006, 85-87). Lines of social 
differentiation, articulated by social identities, do not have to be “quasi-universal” to make a systematic 
difference to the life opportunities, patterns of concrete activity, social relations and identities of 
individuals. One consequence of the inability, or refusal, to take seriously the “powerful salience and 
persistence” of collective identities (Alcoff 2006, 87), has been a deep-seated skepticism about their 
capacity to be in any way socially and epistemically enabling.  
 
The second standard objection to standpoint theory targets the “inversion thesis,” drawing out the 
epistemic implications of an essentialist conception of social identities. The presumption here seems to 
be that if one’s location in a field of socially differentiated identities makes a philosophically interesting 
epistemic difference, it must be a difference in what counts as evidence and in norms of reasoning that 
constitute the basis for adjudicating knowledge claims.25 In this case, the members of different social 
groups must see the world in ways that are incommensurable with one another. The threat of disabling 
relativism is never far from the surface in these discussions, raising the specter of collectives that have 
no basis for settling their epistemic differences except by insisting, by fiat of political or social force, that 
one world view (and its aligned epistemic norms) takes precedence over the others. On this picture, if 
epistemic advantage is to be attributed to any group, it must take the form of a claim of automatic 
epistemic privilege: those who are members of oppressed or subdominant groups are credited with 
knowing more – knowing how things really are – strictly by virtue of their social, political location. 
Feminist standpoint theory was thus condemned as a form of epistemic ‘political correctness’ gone 
badly wrong; it recapitulates hackneyed stereotypes of “women’s ways of knowing,” inverting patterns 
of testimonial injustice in a bid to claim epistemic credibility. In the process, standpoint theorists risked 
undermining their own political and epistemic goals, undercutting any claim that they might have for 
wider recognition of the insights generated by their critiques of inequity and research programs.  
 
It is hard to find a standpoint theorist who embraced an essentialist conception of social identity or a 
formulation of the inversion thesis that attributes automatic privilege to the dispossessed, much less 
any who endorsed the reductive relativism associated with these theses. Such views are, however, 
routinely attributed to standpoint theorists, especially in philosophical contexts where crude 
formulations of standpoint theory figure prominently as a stalking horse for critics who categorically 
reject feminist philosophy of science or feminist epistemology as a contradiction in terms and a cynical 
brief for politicizing knowledge.26  
 
There is certainly much to criticize and rethink in early formulations of standpoint theory as, indeed, 
feminists theorists had themselves been quick recognize. The appeal to object relations theory for a 
mechanism that accounts for a “quasi-universal” gendered orientation to objects of inquiry is certainly 
too crude to be plausible. But note that even this most maligned aspect of feminist standpoint theory 
took the form of a hypothesis about the contingent effects of caregiving practices characteristic of a 
particular family structure and gendered division of labor. Keller herself acknowledged that this was an 
empirical claim (see note #20), and subsequent research has made it clear that, although processes of 
gender identity formation are by no means inconsequential, they are much more malleable and context 
specific than object relations theorists originally recognized. Thanks to the growing body of research on 
cognitive schemas and non-cognitive processing mentioned earlier, we now have much richer 
resources for theorizing the diverse ways in which social norms are internalized and influence our 
behavior along any number of dimensions; crucially, this includes an increasingly nuanced 
understanding of the specific (and variable) content of the schemas we internalize and the contextual 
factors that modulate their effects. In a similar spirit, Hartsock clearly understood her historical 
materialist posit of a fundamental division of labor along gender lines to be to be a contingent feature of 
a particular social formation. It was an ambitious thesis that has since been significantly complicated 
and refined by intersectional analysis, but rather than providing grounds for categorically rejecting 
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standpoint theory, these critiques reinforce the insight that context-specific analysis is required to 
understand exactly how our “cognitive styles” and epistemic resources are affected by the material and 
social conditions of life that function, to varying degrees, as structural features of the social contexts in 
which we operate. It is, in short, an open and empirical question whether, in any given context, systems 
of social differentiation obtain that are robust enough to canalize our lives and shape our identities in 
ways that make a difference to our capacities as epistemic agents.   
 
What most concerns me, however, is not the adequacy of now-conventional critiques of standpoint 
theory; rather it is that charges of essentialism and of automatic privilege miss the mark on a more 
fundamental level. They ignore the epistemic challenges posed by the emerging programs of feminist 
activism and research that motivated initial formations of feminist standpoint theory, and they provide 
no constructive response of their own to these challenges. Feminist research programs continue to 
thrive, evolving through the processes of internal auto-critique that I described at the outset and, as 
they do, the puzzle deepens of how to account for the contributions made by transformative criticism 
grounded in identity-specific forms of experience, angles of vision, and “standpoints.” 
 
 
III. Standpoint theory reframed  
 
In taking up these challenges now, I propose a reformulation of standpoint theory that neither assumes 
nor entails the untenable theses attributed to past formulations, and that draws some key lessons from 
the protracted debate I have described. 
 
First, I propose that standpoint theory is best construed as a purpose-specific epistemic stance; it is not 
a full-service epistemology, an alternative to the conservative (empiricist) and radical (postmodern) 
options that Harding identified when she mapped the epistemic landscape of feminist theory in the mid-
1980s. As Kristen Intemann has argued, standpoint theory is most plausibly understood as compatible 
with a sophisticated feminist empiricism (2010); it requires an account of cognitive-social norms of 
epistemic adequacy capable of underwriting a discerning assessment of the specific kinds of epistemic 
advantage that may be conferred by structurally defined social locations. Nor is standpoint theory just a 
set of methodological maxims, as Smith has been inclined to claim (1997). Her injunction to “start 
inquiry from the margins” presupposes an epistemic rationale that standpoint theory aims to capture. 
Standpoint theory is, rather, a conceptual framework that directs attention to a set of jointly descriptive 
and normative questions about the impact of systematic social differentiation on our epistemic 
capacities, on what we know (well) as situated epistemic agents. The answers generated in response 
to these questions constitute a genre of radically non-ideal theory (Mills 2005); standpoint theories, so 
conceived, not only describe and explain the impact of identity-based epistemic difference on existing 
research programs, they also identify conditions that are conducive to transformative criticism going 
forward.   
 
Second, I identify three social-epistemological theses that comprise the conceptual framework within 
which specific standpoint theories are formulated, each of which is open to a variety of formulations 
depending on the specific target of analysis.  
(1) A generic situated knowledge thesis. The point of departure for standpoint theorizing is a 
recognition that there is no “view from nowhere”; contingent histories, social context and relations, 
inevitably affect what epistemic agents know (including explicit knowledge as well as tacit 
experiential knowledge), and shape the hermeneutic resources, inferential heuristics, and other 
epistemic resources they bring to bear in generating and adjudicating knowledge claims.  
2) A systemic situated knowledge thesis. What distinguishes standpoint theory from other genres of 
social epistemology predicated on a generic situated knowledge thesis is its focus on the epistemic 
effects of systemic structures of social differentiation. Standpoint theorists are concerned to 
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understand the impact, on what we know and how we know, of our location in hierarchical systems 
of power relations that structure our material conditions of life, and the social relations of production 
and reproduction that, in turn, shape our identities and our epistemic capacities.  
3) A thesis of epistemic advantage. Finally, standpoint theorists are particularly interested in the 
kinds of epistemic advantage that may accrue to those who are socially marginal, exploring various  
reformulations of the much despised inversion thesis.  
  
In embracing these stance-defining theses, standpoint theorists need not commit, in advance, to any 
particular substantive account of the structural factors that constitute the social worlds in which knowers 
are situated or of the psychological mechanisms by which these shape their identities and cognitive 
capacities. In particular, they need not assume that, to be socially and epistemically consequential, 
these structural conditions must be “quasi-universal.” It is, as indicated earlier, an open (empirical) 
question whether such structures obtain in a given context, what form they take, and how they are 
internalized or embodied by individuals. So conceived, standpoint theorizing proceeds on the 
assumption that systematic patterns of social differentiation, and the social identities based on them, 
cannot be presumed to be epistemically irrelevant. Feminist standpoint theorists are characteristically 
suspicious of any program of inquiry that “disappears gender” as a relevant dimension of epistemic 
inquiry.27 
 
Likewise, the distinctive standpoint claim about epistemic advantage on the margins – the inversion 
thesis – need not, indeed, should not be construed as an attribution of automatic or comprehensive 
epistemic privilege to members of subdominant social groups. Any number of feminist as well as critical 
race and class theorists have made the point that social, economic disadvantage is often constituted by 
and imposes epistemic deficits. For example, as Uma Narayan observes, the oppressed may have 
immediate experience of how systems of exploitation operate but are “denied access to education and 
hence, to the means of theory production”; they may see more clearly certain realities and effects of 
class, race, and gender divisions, but may not have “a detailed causal/structural analysis of how their 
specific form of oppression originated, how it has been maintained and all the systemic purposes it 
serves” (1988, 35-36). Here, again, it is an open question whether the features of social location that 
make an epistemic difference confer epistemic advantage, what these advantages are, and whether 
they are relevant to specific epistemic projects. The inversion thesis, reframed in terms of differential 
epistemic advantage (rather than automatic privilege), takes the form of a directive to raise these 
questions, and a caution against reproducing, in epistemic inquiry, conventional forms of testimonial 
injustice. It articulates a recognition that those who are disadvantaged by structural conditions may well 
have epistemic resources that the comparatively privileged lack. 
 
As this suggests, the kinds of epistemic advantage that standpoint theorizing brings into focus vary 
widely.28 Most prosaically, those who are socially marginal may be privy to evidence, and may develop 
the interpretive heuristics necessary to understand and to navigate dimensions of the social and natural 
world that the comparatively privileged rarely engage, or are invested in avoiding. More controversially, 
distinctive forms of knowledge may arise from non-mainstream social and cultural traditions that have 
taken shape quite independently of those that constitute dominant culture. Finally, the experience of 
exclusion or marginalization may itself be a source of insight. Various forms of critical dissociation and 
comparative meta-knowledge become possible, indeed, necessary when survival as an insider-outsider 
requires that you understand the norms of a dominant culture as well as those that structure your own 
subdominant community. The dissonance described by Collins (1991, 49-50), the sociological ruptures 
and “fault lines” exploited by ethnomethodologists like Smith (1987, 49), and the “double 
consciousness” made famous by W. E. B. Du Bois (1993 [1904], 7-15) are all examples of the kinds of 
experience that can put those who are socially marginal in a position to recognize what remains tacit for 
members of a dominant culture, in the process catalyzing counter-narratives and counter-norms that 
have the conceptual resources, lacking in dominant culture, to name and to make sense of this 
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dissident experience.  
 
This last type of epistemic advantage throws into relief a third and final feature of standpoint theory: the 
recognition that a standpoint is, as Kathi Weeks puts it, “a project, not an inheritance; it is achieved, not 
given” (Weeks 1996, 106). The resources of situated knowledge may give rise to but do not, in 
themselves, constitute a standpoint. Hartsock argues that “a standpoint is not simply an interested 
position (interpreted as bias) but is interested in the sense of being engaged” 1983, 285).29 In the sense 
developed here, a standpoint is characterized by a particular kind of epistemic engagement, a matter of 
cultivating a critical awareness, empirical and conceptual, of the social conditions under which 
knowledge is produced and authorized. Standpoint theory concerns, then, not just the epistemic effects 
of social location but the effects and the emancipatory potential of a critical standpoint on knowledge 
production. So conceived, the project of standpoint theory is to systematically investigate the epistemic 
effects (in both senses) of immersion in different kinds of social relations and concrete activities within 
systems of hierarchically structured social differentiation. This is engaged philosophy in the further 
sense that its goal is to put the insights generated by standpoint analysis to work in assessing, 
calibrating and improving the cognitive-social norms that govern the epistemic practices on which we 
depend for action-guiding knowledge of the social and natural worlds in which we live.  
 
 
IV. Standpoint theory: scope and practice 
 
To illustrate standpoint theory at work in these two senses – in analysis of the effects of situated 
knowledge and of a reflexive standpoint on knowledge production – and to address questions of scope, 
I close with two brief archaeological examples.  
 
The first is a standpoint-informed analysis of the emergence of “gender research” in archaeology. This 
was a strikingly late development compared to those described at the outset. It was not until the mid-
1980s that archaeologists took an interest in questions about gender and developed feminist critiques 
of androcentrism and sexism in the research priorities, interpretative conventions, and modes of 
representation typical of archaeology, and it was not until the early 1990s that the first major 
publications appeared, some 25 to 30 years after feminist research programs took shape in such 
closely aligned fields as history and cultural anthropology. Intrigued by this development, I undertook a 
series of interviews with the organizers and a survey of participants in the first major international 
conference on “The Archaeology of Gender,” convened in Calgary in 1989.30  
 
At the outset I assumed that the catalyst for gender archaeology must have been feminist analysis 
informed by activist engagement and exposure to the feminist scholarship that had flourished in 
neighboring fields. As Linda Gordon put it in a retrospective assessment of feminist history, one "hardly 
need mention that the feminist retellings of the past [were] stimulated by feminist political challenges to 
present-day structures and relationships" (1986, 21). Certainly, those who published the initial critiques, 
organized the first conferences, and assembled the first edited volumes were self-identified feminists 
and well versed in feminist scholarship. But a very different picture emerged from a content analysis of 
the abstracts (Kelly and Hanen 1992), and from the results of my survey.31 I learned that, although 
women were disproportionately represented on the program of the 1989 conference (80% of the 
presenters were women, at a time when women comprised 36% of the membership of the Society for 
American Archaeology), and although three-quarters of respondents reported that they had a pre-
existing interest in questions about gender (this was the reason they attended the conference), few had 
a background in women’s studies or feminist scholarship, and a majority made it clear that they did not 
equate an interest in gender with any kind of feminist commitment or affiliation; more than half the 
women and a larger majority of the men were explicit that they did not identify as feminists. Probing 
further I discovered that, while the average age of the women attending this conference was similar to 
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that of the men (43 compared to 40 years, respectively), their distribution across age cohorts was very 
different; 60% of the women (twice the proportion of men) were clustered in the 26-40 year age range. 
This meant that a majority of the women had entered the field in the late 1970s, completed their 
graduate training in early 1980s, and established professional careers by the time of the conference – 
in a period when the representation of women in North American archaeology had more than doubled.  
 
As members of the first cohorts in which a critical mass of women had entered archaeology, the women 
who were drawn to the 1989 “Archaeology of Gender” conference seemed acutely aware that their very 
presence in the field posed a challenge to conventional assumptions about women’s roles and 
capabilities, even as they disavowed feminist affinities. I hypothesized that the dissonance they 
experienced in their professional working lives threw into relief gender norms that not only structured 
the institutions of archaeology but were presupposed by the conceptual framework of the discipline. 
The Chacmool conference gave them an opportunity to engage these issues—to critically scrutinize 
gender-normative assumptions—on the intellectual terrain of scholarly inquiry, as a subject of 
archaeological inquiry. In short, I hypothesized that, while a majority of those involved distanced 
themselves from a feminist standpoint, they drew on the resources of situated knowledge; their 
contributions to the formation of gender archaeology reflected a largely untheorized and apolitical 
awareness of the contingent nature of gender roles that arose from their positioning in the field as 
professional insiders but gender outsiders.  
 
The discomfort with identity-based (feminist) scholarship and activism expressed by many participants 
in the 1989 “Archaeology of Gender” conference has since intensified into an explicit repudiation of 
feminist influences. In the last decade, several prominent advocates of gender archaeology have 
objected that feminist “political overtones and associations” have compromised this research program, 
contributing to its marginalization within mainstream archaeology where they find it viewed “with 
suspicion” (Sørensen 2000, 5).32 They aggressively defend ideals of objectivity that equate epistemic 
credibility with the impartiality of a presumed “view from nowhere,” precisely the epistemic norms that 
underpin the objections that provoked their response: that gender research must be feminist, and 
therefore inherently biased. This is a deeply conflicted defensive stance, not just because the 
archaeology of gender showed little more engagement with feminist scholarship after a decade than 
was evident in 1989, but also because it effectively denies the originality of the contributions of a 
research program that arose, not from business as usual, but from the critical insights of women whose 
dissident experience put them in a position to recognize, and counteract, the unremarked 
androcentrism of mainstream archaeology. In their concern to defend the epistemic integrity of gender 
archaeology, its advocates do not consider the possibility that the conventional ideals of objectivity 
might, themselves, need to be reconceptualized to account for the situated epistemic agency that 
mobilized gender archaeology. I elsewhere propose a reframing of ideals of objectivity that give central 
place to a consideration of the epistemic virtues that make for good quality knowledge, indexed to 
problem and context of use, and to features of epistemic practice that are most likely to foster these 
epistemic virtues procedures – the social-cognitive norms of community practice.33 But this is a topic for 
another time.  
 
This pattern of circumscribing the impact of presumptively feminist interventions, declaring them no 
threat to conventional epistemic norms and ideals, is evident in a number of contexts, especially in 
connection with debate about the implications of equity critiques. As one trenchant critic of gender 
inequities in the physical sciences puts it, the institutions and professional culture of these sciences 
may be profoundly sexist, but “photons have no gender” (Urry 2008); inequities in the application of 
meritocratic norms—a reliance on working indicators of rational authority that relegate women to the 
margins, that impose glass ceilings and reinforce leaky pipelines—have no bearing on the conceptual, 
empirical integrity of the science. The assumption seems to be that, if the subject domain is not 
gendered, critiques that purport to identify the effects of gender bias in the content of the science can 
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get no traction. A second archaeological example illustrates how systemic patterns of inequity in a 
discipline can have substantial epistemic impact of just this kind.  
 
This final case is an analysis of the gender politics of Paleoindian research developed by Joan Gero, 
one of the early, explicitly feminist catalysts for gender research in archaeology (Gero 1993).34 
Paleoindian cultures had long been characterized as highly specialized large game hunters, defined 
archaeologically in terms of the tool kits and distinctive kill sites associated with hunting Pleistocene 
mammoth and bison. The central problematic of Paleoindian studies was, then, to explain what 
happened to the Paleoindians when the Pleistocene mega-fauna went extinct; had they been replaced 
by broad spectrum foragers, or somehow undergone a dramatic transformation? On Gero’s account, 
this was a resolutely male-dominated field, characterized by a focus on stereotypically male activities; 
she documented patterns of gender segregation within Paleoindian studies in which men focused on 
hunting assemblages, replicating technically sophisticated Clovis points and associated hunting and 
butchering practices, while women chiefly worked on expedient stone tools, doing edge wear and 
residue analysis. She also found that women in the field were cited less frequently than their male 
counterparts, even when they worked on the same material, unless they published with a male co-
author. As a result, the evidence that women were producing of a diverse range of foraging activities, 
based on close analysis of the smaller blades and flake tools presumed to be associated with women’s 
activities, had largely gone unnoticed. Not only was the account of Paleoindian subsistence practices 
incomplete, but the defining research agenda of the field, the “bison-mammoth knowledge construct” 
(1993, 37), was an artifact of androcentric biases implicit in the characterization of Paleoindian 
subsistence in terms of a continent-wide “Clovis adaptation.” The whole conceptual framing of the field 
had to be rethought.  
 
Although this is a case in which the subject domain is gendered, it illustrates a strategy for 
standpoint analysis that extends straightforwardly to non-gendered subject domains. If gender 
segregation is entrenched in a scientific field, as it is in many, and if patterns of professional 
uptake and response reflect evaluation bias (e.g., in citation, collaboration, funding), then it is to 
be expected that the questions women ask and the results they generate in the disciplinary 
niches where they typically work will get less recognition, and will have less impact on the 
trajectories of research in their fields than do the contributions of men, operating in comparably 
better supported and more influential research niches. In cases like these, systematic patterns 
of testimonial injustice translate into a self-reinforcing canalization of research effort that has the 
potential to shape everything from the specifics of research practice to dominant styles of 
reasoning and core framework commitments: what will count as significant questions and as 
compelling answers to them. There is no need to invoke an implausibly generalized “women’s 
way of knowing,” or the dynamics of ethnocentric projection specific to fields that deal with 
gendered subjects, to recognize that gender inequities can generate a cascade of content 
effects that raise serious questions about the epistemic integrity the field. This suggests that the 
ratification of empirical and theoretical results as objective, as knowledge claims we can trust, 
must be informed by a systematic assessment of how well the epistemic resources of diverse, 
situated epistemic agents have been incorporated into their adjudication; social-cognitive norms 
of community practice must bring a critical standpoint perspective to bear on the processes 
knowledge production if they are to be epistemically credible.  
 
In conclusion, then, I argue that we need a robust standpoint theory to understand the epistemic 
effects of systematic social differentiation, including both the effects of situated knowledge and 
the conditions that foster transformative criticism. I submit that these lines of analysis apply as 
directly to philosophy as a discipline as to any empirical science.  
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Notes 
                                                       
1 The analysis of standpoint theory presented here originated in Wylie (2003), and various aspects of the 
argument have been developed in more idetail in Wylie (2011a, and 2012).  
2 I invoke, here, Alan Richardson’s discussion of the “anxious nightmareof people wholly 
incomprehensible to one another,” a form of “philosophical hypochodria” (from Peirce), that haunts 
contemporary philosophy by which, as he describes it, any weakening of commitment to epistemic 
foundationalism is presumed to entail an inescapable slide into epistemic nihilism (2006, 9).  
3 Transformative criticism originating in feminist research programs was by no means an isolated 
phenomenon. Class-based Marxist analysis had catalyzed an earlier generation of standpoint theories on 
which feminists drew (see the discussion of Hartsock that follows), and the development of race critical 
theory has a parallel trajectory, one that has had a profound impact on feminist theorizing.  
4 Carmita Wood’s legal battle, and the pivotal role it played framing the concept of sexual harassment and 
mobilizing feminist activism, is described in detail by Brownmiller (1990; as cited by Fricker, 2007, 149). 
5 Recent critiques and extensions of Fricker’s analysis bring into sharp focus the extent to which gaps in 
the heremeneutical resources of a dominant culture are not inadvertent, and should not be assumed to 
imply a lack of resource on the part of the subdominant communities whose experience is misrecognized 
(Mason 2011; Dotson 2011).  
6 For an assessment of the debate about experiential evidence, see Wylie (1987). 
7 I draw a parallel here with Morgan’s recent analysis of the process by which the concept of a “glass 
ceiling” went from a metaphor to what she describes as a well defined “middle range fact”: a persistent 
pattern of blockages in the career advancement of professional women into the most senior positions 
(2010). 
8 For further discussion of chilly climate research see Wylie (2011a), Wylie, Jakobsen and Fosado (2007), 
and the Chilly Collective (1995).   
9 Hoschild opens a new edition of The Second Shift (2003, originaly published in 1989) with the 
observation that “the number of women in paid work has risen steadily since before the turn of the 
century, but since 1950 the rise has been staggering”: from 30% in 1950 to over two thirds by 2002 
(2003, 2).  
10 Merton’s reference was to Matthew (13:12): ‘For whomsoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall 
have more abundance; but whomsoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.’ 
Where Merton had focused on the effects of cumulative advantage in academic contexts, Rossiter drew 
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attention to a gendered pattern of cumulative disadvantage. She named this principle the ‘Mathilda Effect’ 
in honor of the 19th century suffragette, Mathilda Gage, who developed an early critique of the ways in 
which women’s contributions to collective knowledge had been ignored or appropriated (1993). 
11 I have in mind here the investigation, in a number of different contexts, of the mechanisms of automatic 
cognitive processing responsible for the apparent irrationality of common problem-solving strategies, 
much of which developed quite independently of the feminist research programs I have described. Valian 
provides a comprehensive review of such research the aim of which was to bring its results to bear on the 
equity issues addressed by feminist activist/researchers (1999).  
12 The summary that follows draws on Wylie (1997a), and is outlined in the sections contributed by Wylie 
to Wylie, Potter and Bauchspies (2012 [2009]).  
13 The recommendatino that feminist social scientists should take seriously the concepts and assumptions 
that are salient within a context – they should “start from the margins,” or “think from women’s lives” as 
Harding puts it (1991) – should not be understood to imply an uncritical endorsement of the 
understanding of insiders. For an assessment of debate about this methodological principle, see Wylie 
(1992).  
14 For an especially valuable analysis of this debate see Behnabib (1992), and for an overview of the 
various genres of “care ethics” that were inspired by Gilligan within a decade of the appearance of In a 
Different Voice, see Held (1993, chapter 3).  
15 See, for example, Harding’s discussion of the limitations of remedial research programs focused on 
“women worthies,” “women victims,” and “women’s contributions” in the range of fields cited here (1986, 
30-31).  
16 Haraway’s account, in Primate Visions (1989), of the formation of primatology and its enganglements 
with military and capitalist interests is perhaps the most influential and expansive critique along these 
lines, key elements of which appeared in the early 1980s. See, as well, Fedigan (1986), for discussion of 
the gender dynamics of the field, and contributions to Primate Encounters (Strum and Fedigan 2000) for a 
retrospective assessment of these debates.  
17 For a recent overview of “gendered innovations” in the physical and life sciences and engineering, see 
contributors to Schiebinger (2008). 
18 I use the term “transformative criticism” in the sense explicated by Longino (1990, 70-73). 
19 This presupposes, of course, ideals of science as value-free or value-neutral, impartial, and context-
transcendent, predicated on standard distinctions between fact and value, fact and theory, and between  
the context of discovery and that of verification (or justification).  
20 Hartsock observes that, “unlike men, women’s lives are institutionally defined by their production of 
use-values in the home” (1983, 291). 
21 Keller is careful to note that she takes the differences between masculine and feminine “minds” to be a 
function, not of “biological differences between male and female brains,” but of developmental processes 
(1985, 79-80). She asks: “How we are to account for our adherence [to the belief that] the associations 
between scientific and masculine are simply true?” (1978, 415). This passage, among others, suggests 
that what she means to explain are robust and ubiquitous perceptions of gender difference that certainly 
influence behavior but may also obscure diversity in behavior and cognitive style that does not fit the 
stereotypes. In this spirit, Jane Roland Martin agues that Keller should be read as offering an analysis of 
cultural constructs of masculinity and the ways in which symbolically masculine traits are associated with 
science (1988, 135-137). Reflecting on Gould’s critique (see below), she observes that “we do not have 
enough evidence to know if the different style does or does not characterize the scientific practice of one 
sex more than the other” (1988, 135).  
22 While Harding’s critique of object relations theory provides compelling grounds for rejecting the 
psychoanlaytic formulations of standpoint theory, it leaves untouched the historical materialist dimensions 
of Hartsock’s account (Wylie 1987). 
23 As Beauvoir puts this point in the introduction to The Second Sex: “The biological and social sciences 
no longer admit the existence of unchangeably fixed entities that determine given characteristics, such as 
those ascribed to woman, the Jew, or the Negro” (Beauvoir 1952, xiv). 
24 The further worry articulated in this debate is that if social identities are, in fact, consequential – if they 
do shape the lives and identities of individuals – this can only be because they are an opportunistic 
political construct, coercively imposed on group members in ways that undermine the integrity of 
individual agency. When Alcoff addresses the question of why social identity categories were 
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conceptualized in these starkly polarized terms, she offers the diagnosis that this reflects an underlying 
anxiety about identity categories of any kind: that they are “foisted on the self from the outside, by the 
Other” (2006, 81), grounded in a static, self-warranting set of interests external to the individual and 
therefore inevitably compromising, never enabling their autonomy and flourishing as individuals. 
25 For an analysis of this line of argument as represented by Boghossian (2006), see Wylie (2011b). 
26 Consider, for example, Haack’s characterization of feminist philosophy of science and epistemology, 
originally published in 1993 and reprinted several times, without amendment, most recently in Pinnick, 
Koertge and Almeda (2003). For a systematic critique of such accounts see Anderson (2004).  
27 Longino articulates this “bottom line” commitment in the context of identifying norms of practice (“community 
values”) that had informed feminist research in a range of sciences; it is not specifically associated with standpoint 
theory. None of the norms of practice that Longino described were explicitly feminist but, together, she argued, 
they function as evaluative standards that “mak[e] gender a relevant axis of investigation”; they serve to “prevent 
gender from being disappeared” (1994, 481). I develop an analysis of these principles as they figure in feminist 
social science in Wylie (2012), and I made a case for their relevance to feminist epistemology in Wylie (1995). 
28 This discussion of epistemic advantage summarizes an argument originally developed in Wylie (2003), 
elaborated more recently in discussions of how and why community-based collaborative practice – 
specifically, archaeological collaborations with Native American communities – can significantly enrich 
inquiry epistemically (Wylie 2011b).  
29 Hartsock later characterizes the formation of a standpoint as a matter of developing an “oppositional 
consciousness . . . which takes nothing of the dominant culture as self-evidently true” (1997, 96-97). 
30 My primary interest was in the epistemic implications of the early critiques of sex/gender bias in 
archeology (Wylie 1996, 1997b), but this required an understanding of how and why they arose. An 
account of the formation of “gender archaeology” and an initial analysis of these survey results appeared 
in Wylie (1992). The conference proceedings were published in 1991 (Walde and Willows).  
31 This 1989 conference was one of a series of annual “Chacmool” conferences that had been hosted by 
the University of Calgary since 1966. Each year the student organizers choose a different theme and, 
prior to the “Archaeology of Gender,” they typically drew 40 to 60 submissions, many of them from 
regional colleagues who were regular Chacmool attendees. With over 100 submissions, the 1989 
conference was substantially larger, and its international reach much greater, than previous Chacmool 
meetings. Altogether 72% of those listed on the final program responded to my survey, but some of the 
demographic data reported here (e.g., the representation of women and of international participants) was 
drawn from the published program. While over half the men presenting at the 1989 conference had 
attended previous Chacmools, fewer than half the women reported any previous experience with these 
meetings.  
32 For an analysis of this dissociation of gender archaeology from feminist politics or scholarship, see the 
introduction to Conkey and Wylie (2007). 
33 In this account (Wylie 2003, 2012) I draw on Longino’s procedural account of objectivity (2002, 128-
135), and Lloyd’s extension of her analysis (2005, 241-255). 
34 The details of this analysis are available in Wylie (2002, 188-189).  
